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MONTHLY REPORT



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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

2 July 1965

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

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SOUTH VIETNAM MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

I. THE SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The restoration of the military to power, precipitated by a protracted government crisis and the resignation of Phan Huy Quat as premier on 12 June, has produced a still uncertain mixture of political assets and liabilities. While this most recent change does not appear thus far to have seriously disturbed the functioning of government or entirely shattered the fragile political stability achieved during Quat's tenure, the short-run prospects of the new government do not appear more promising than those of the Quat government. General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the chief of state and premier respectively, will have to face the same pressures and problems that have toppled previous governments and impeded the military effort against the Viet Cong.

2. There are several positive factors in the current political and governmental situations. The Thieu-Ky government, probably more than any of its predecessors, has struck a "revolutionary" public posture, calling for an intensified mobilization of the country's resources behind the war effort while at the same time proposing radical social, economic, political, and administrative reforms. The cabinet itself consists largely of young new faces--apparently dynamic and highly motivated technicians with varied professional backgrounds. At the same time, the retention of several members of the Quat cabinet has maintained a degree of operational and administrative continuity in the government. During the past month or so, the military leadership has displayed a considerable degree of unity which, if it continues, could generate the power and authority that has heretofore been lacking to implement the diverse array of programs crucial to the war effort. Thus far, the military leadership appears to have retained the support of Buddhist and student elements

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and at least temporarily to have disarmed the Catholics, southern (Cochinchinese or "sudist") politicians, and some labor leaders who had criticized Quat and eventually forced his ouster.

3. On the negative side, there is little political sophistication among the present military leaders, who show little grasp of the immensity and complexity of the problems they face. Though zealous and strongly nationalistic, they tend to be impatient, to oversimplify issues, and to propose extreme solutions with little prior planning of specific courses of action or appreciation of their potential impact. Some of the government's social, economic, and political proposals are so drastic that they risk antagonizing the sophisticated and well-entrenched urban elements, and also run considerable danger of straining the country's limited bureaucratic resources. While success may galvanize the new leadership and its supporters, failure or the realization that some programs are not realistic could easily arouse public opposition and even personal antagonisms within the leadership. However united they may be at the moment as a result of the purging of older or "non-revolutionary" officers, it would be rash to assume that the present military leaders will be immune to temptations to allow ambitions for power to override national or military interests, or to divisions generated by mutual suspicions such as have already been reported between Ky and Colonel Lieu. As head of the National Police, Lieu is also a close friend and protege of General Thi. Finally, at a time when the war appears to be entering a new level of intensity and seriousness, the preoccupation of the generals with political matters could seriously weaken Vietnamese military capabilities. It is possible that the military, though exercising real power and holding the top governmental posts, may actually delegate considerable authority to civilian officials. However, should this authority cover little more than day-to-day operations, the political demands on the generals would still be excessively distracting.

4. At the present time, the new government seems to enjoy relative freedom from open opposition despite continuing undercurrents of skepticism and criticism.

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Indeed, the new leadership appears to have inspired a degree of acceptance reminiscent of--though by no means equal to--that displayed after the ouster of the Diem regime. However, its public image is thus far based on dynamically-stated goals rather than on any concrete action to implement new government programs or improve existing ones. The next month or so may be crucial, for it is obvious that the government's supporters as well as its critics are reserving final judgment until the new leadership clearly demonstrates its capabilities.

Economic Situation

5. Economic difficulties and dislocations increased during the past month as a result of stepped-up Viet Cong activities. Local shortages of goods and price rises were a recurrent feature of the scene. The rice situation has not improved although the Saigon rice merchants did agree to sell 50,000 tons of rice from the GVN stockpile at the end of June. The pressures of military demands have also been felt in the form of rising labor costs, and in increased competition for construction materials between GVN and US agencies. Finally, there were continuing difficulties in developing sea transport between Saigon and central Vietnam as a substitute for the land routes interdicted by the Viet Cong.

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The Viet Cong summer campaign, which started in late May, moved into high gear during the month of June. The level of Viet Cong-initiated activity in all categories rose sharply to approximately the 2,645* mark compared to 2,263 for May, the highest monthly incident total since October 1964. Particularly significant was the sharp rise in Viet Cong efforts to interdict lines of communications. There were at least 450* acts of sabotage, almost the same rate as that maintained during the final stages of the enemy military campaign of September and October 1964. Armed attacks were comparatively few but, significantly, there were several Viet Cong attacks conducted in regimental or multi-battalion strength.

Despite the continued success of their ambush tactics, the Viet Cong are relying mainly on small-scale terrorism, harassment, and acts of sabotage to further their overall objective of increasing war weariness. Most Viet Cong-initiated activity occurred in the delta south of Saigon, with the other three corps areas receiving almost equal shares. However, in the last two weeks of June, the northern provinces have received increased enemy attention, particularly in the highlands of II Corps. The 25 June capture of a district town, Tou Moron in Kontum, also reflects increased enemy strength and capability in the area. It appears that this attack was carried out by the entire 101st Regiment, PAVN 325th Division. A rallier,

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[redacted] surrendered and accurately foretold the attack [redacted]

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The Viet Cong military campaign is focusing upon two principle objectives: first, to sever all lines of communications, and secondly, to draw out, isolate, and destroy GVN and US units, seeking to inflict psychological as well as military defeats.

In pursuit of the first objective, the Viet Cong embarked on a major campaign to interdict rail

* Projected estimates through 30 June; figures in charts and tables reflect data through 26 June only.

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and road communications. The railroad, always a favorite enemy target, became even more tenuous as a national lifeline during June. At month's end, the railroad was operational only from Nha Trang southward for a distance of some 45 miles to Phan Rang. All major highways were cut and many remain closed to through traffic, particularly those leading west from the central coastal provinces into the interior. As of 26 June, all major lines of communications leading into II Corps were closed. Three recent ambushes and the capture of 14 tons of rice on Route 21 east of Ban Me Thout in Darlac reflect the degree of Viet Cong control of this key road in the southern portion of II Corps. According to COMUSMACV, continued interdiction of routes leading into the high plateau will soon make it necessary to rely on air delivery of essential military and civilian supplies. Nearer to Saigon, Route 1 is cut in Long Khanh Province and Route 13 was severed in Binh Duong. Many roads leading out from Saigon are blocked and many of the minor roads in the Hop Tac zone have been harassed into virtual disuse. The absence of regular communications to the outlying areas is also having an adverse effect on the national economy, particularly in urban areas.

A change of Viet Cong tactics regarding sabotage has become more apparent in recent weeks. Previously, the Viet Cong seemed content simply to harass or temporarily damage the transportation system and its facilities in order to cause inconveniences. However, in the past few weeks it has become apparent that the Viet Cong are attempting to cause more permanent damage to bridges and other important transportation assets. The net result is to reduce ARVN's overland reaction capability and to isolate friendly forces.

Toward the attainment of this second objective, which is directly related to the first, Viet Cong forces are attempting to draw out individual ARVN units and destroy them. Ambushes have increased and many have been highly successful. Although ambushes have occurred in all parts of the nation, most have occurred in the interior provinces north of Saigon and in the Kontum-Pleiku-Phu Bom-Darlac region, an area that has come under increased Communist pressure in the past few weeks. A reflection of the success of the Viet Cong

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ambush tactic throughout the nation has been an increased defensive posture and attitude on the part of some senior ARVN commanders.

The pattern of enemy activities in June suggests a further but gradual intensification of the war--the level of which will fluctuate from week to week--into the wet summer months. The Viet Cong seem likely to continue their ambush tactics and highway interdiction to deny access to the interior regions to friendly forces, and to destroy them whenever they can be encountered on terms favorable to the Viet Cong.

Increased Viet Cong pressures throughout South Vietnam is having an important impact on those who heretofore had been least affected by the fighting in the countryside--the urban population. This group is able to apply considerable pressure on the government, and psychologically is the most vulnerable to economic shortages caused by enemy interdiction of the transportation system.

The region most vulnerable to a large-scale coordinated Viet Cong attack continues to be the central highland area, although a similar assault in other areas of South Vietnam is possible and feasible. In the highland plateau, consisting of Darlac, Pleiku, Kontum, and Phu Bon provinces, COMUSMACV estimates that as many as 21 Viet Cong battalions with a total strength of over 10,000 may be present.

2. Government-initiated military operations during the month of June reflected, in part, the growing lack of aggressiveness shown by some senior ARVN commanders. Small-unit actions remained fairly constant, but the number of GVN units in contact with the Viet Cong remained insignificant. The number of large-unit actions declined slightly and the number of GVN units making enemy contact declined proportionately. Several operations during the month were reported to have had good results but generally these were few when compared to the total friendly large-scale activity. As the end of June approached, the main thrust of

ARVN-initiated operations in I Corps were generally in the coastal areas in reaction to Viet Cong threats; in II and III Corps, efforts to reopen some transportation routes were only partially successful, while in IV Corps, ARVN continued to support reconstruction efforts in provinces along the northern bank of the Mekong River.

ARVN units received several setbacks during the month, principally from Viet Cong ambushes in the interior regions of II and III Corps. The Dong Xoai engagement resulted in additional ARVN units being declared combat ineffective by COMUSMACV. As of 26 June, five regiments and nine battalions were rated combat ineffective by US senior advisors.

Government force strengths increased slightly during the month despite a high desertion rate, particularly among the regular and regional forces. Since the first of the year, total desertions rose from approximately 6,900 in January to over 11,000 in March, and then declined to about 10,200 in April and to about 9,600 in May. However, regular force desertions have remained high, rising to more than 4,200 in May compared to 3,600 in April.

3. Preliminary statistics indicate mixed results. The KIA ratio favors the government approximately 1.5:1, a reduction from May when the ratio favored the government by about 2:1. On the other hand, the weapon-loss ratio favors the Viet Cong by better than 3:1, an increase from May when the weapons loss favored the Viet Cong by approximately 2:1. The number of Viet Cong military defectors returning to government control under the Chieu Hoi policy remains high, numbering over 700 for June.

C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. The Rural Reconstruction program achieved little during the month of June. In the I and II Corps zones, the security situation continued to deteriorate and nothing in the way of a sustained rural reconstruction effort was reported from these areas during the past month. In the high-priority Hop Tac area, although progress toward established goals was characterized as "slow but steady," the second phase of the program has been delayed and the target date for completion set back three months to 30 September 1965. Reasons advanced by a GVN spokesman for the slowdown include political unrest, lack of funds, slowness in activating Regional Force units, and lagging recruitment for the Popular Forces. Recent reports from III Corps indicate that a progressively deteriorating security situation in Hau Nghia and Long An provinces has caused a widening gap between the government and the people. There is no clear evidence of significant progress or regression in IV corps.

2. In a directive dated 22 June 1965, the new government confirmed the continued existence of the Provincial Coordinating Committee, which consists of the province chief, a USOM province representative, and the MACV sector advisor. The new directive confirms the primacy of the GVN province chief in decisions to commit provincial funds under the Provincial Rural Reconstruction Program. Although American advisors are to be consulted, the province chief may follow or ignore their advice. In the event that the American advisors do not concur in the decision of a province chief, they are required to submit their reasons in writing to the Central Rural Reconstruction Council. The central council will help to resolve difficulties that arise; it may, for example, send a team to the province to provide direct assistance.

3. Incomplete figures for the month of June show that the number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program totalled 5,482 individuals, of which 748 were military and 236 political cadres; the balance were draft dodgers or civilians. The number of returnees claimed for June is the highest recorded for

this year, although the number of military returnees was short of the 394 who returned to GVN control in May.

4. The GVN showed a heightened interest in psychological warfare operations during the month. Increased flexibility in this kind of activity was evidenced by rapid exploitation of information received from prisoners and Chieu Hoi returnees.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

A. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. A new surface-to-air missile (SAM) site in the vicinity of Hanoi was disclosed in photography this month. This site--about 10 nautical miles west-northwest of the city--is the fourth one detected to date in the Hanoi area. Two revetments of the new site are almost complete and the other four are in various stages of construction--one of them nearing completion. No missiles have as yet been detected at any of the SAM installations.

2. Three North Vietnamese jet fighters were shot down in air engagements during June as US air strikes moved into north-western North Vietnam, some 70 miles from the Chinese border.

B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Negotiations

DRV intransigence in the face of continuing US air strikes was reflected in the hard line of both official statements and the tone of public propaganda commentary. DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in a conversation with a Western diplomat in early June displayed complete disinterest in discussing negotiations with the US. Reflecting the same air of confidence, Hanoi propaganda featured separate interviews with President Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong on the 18th and 19th. Both leaders emphasized DRV intentions to "stand firm at the southeastern outpost of the socialist camp and wage a war of resistance which will be protracted and arduous but surely victorious."

Although neither the Liberation Front nor Hanoi has specifically refused to meet with the Commonwealth Peace Mission representatives, both have condemned the composition and purpose of the mission in their propaganda. In an authoritative newspaper article on 21 June North Vietnam attacked the mission for serving US aims, and the Front has twice characterized the Peace Mission as a swindle.

On 28 June, the DRV responded officially and ambiguously to the mission request to visit Hanoi. The British consul general in Hanoi was summoned by the municipality's director of Foreign Affairs and informed that there was no question of a reply by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam because of "the form" of the mission's appeal. When the consul general asked for clarification of this statement, he was told that the use of the words "North Vietnamese authorities" was "inappropriate" as the British Government and the world were well aware of the existence of the government of the DRV.

The return of the mission's request without reply appears to have been an effort by Hanoi to turn aside the peace mission without actually officially refusing to accept it. The North Vietnamese probably hope by this tactic to avoid offending Afro-Asian members of the mission such as Ghana.

Peiping and Moscow have both rejected a request to receive the Commonwealth mission, Moscow on the grounds that it has not been authorized by anyone to conduct talks on a Vietnam issue, and Peiping because the Commonwealth mission is sponsoring Washington's "peace swindle."

2. Intervention

Press reports during the first week of June that US troops would be committed to combat in South Vietnam received rapid condemnation by both the Front and Hanoi. On 9 June the Liberation Front escalated the language of their call for foreign volunteers by threatening to call for "military" volunteers, and on the 12th said that the US action "now more than ever before" gave the Front the right to take such action. On the 14th the NFLSV said that "US warlike policies" had erased the "temporary demarcation line at the 17th parallel," raising the spectre of DRV troops moving across the demilitarized zone.

Peiping has been gradually spelling out the conditions under which it would intervene directly in Vietnam. In terms calculated to present a convincing image of determination and probably in the hope of deterring the US, these statements assert that Peiping is not seeking war, but if attacked or seriously threatened will respond with a Korean-style war in Southeast Asia. At the same time, all Chinese countermoves are justified as self-defense. Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yi told [redacted]

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[redacted] that if the war in Vietnam took a turn which threatened to destroy the DRV, Communist China would be compelled to come in as it had in the Korean War. The Chinese leaders said the major considerations in such a decision would be the effect of a military or economic collapse in the Communist world and the "intolerable circumstance" which would result from the extension of US military power to China's frontier. About a month later, at the end of May, Foreign Minister Chen Yi told a [redacted] that if the US bombed China it would mean war, and asked that this be transmitted to Washington.

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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. FRANCE

At a press conference on June 24, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do announced a break in diplomatic relations between South Vietnam and France. Do made it clear that the GVN does not consider cultural or commercial ties with France to be affected by this diplomatic rupture. A French Foreign Office official told the US Embassy in Paris that the French consul general in Saigon would probably stay. He added that there are approximately 18,000 Frenchmen in the area, plus important economic interests.

B. GVN CONDITIONS FOR SETTLEMENT OF VIETNAMESE SITUATION

Foreign Minister Do spelled out the GVN's "Four Points" for settlement of the Vietnamese conflict during a ceremony commemorating foreign assistance to South Vietnam, as follows: 1) subversive and military activities undertaken, directed, or supported by outside forces against the South Vietnamese people must cease. This would include Hanoi dissolving all the puppet organizations it has formed in South Vietnam such as the Liberation Front and the Peoples' Revolutionary Party; 2) South Vietnam must be left alone, to choose and shape for itself its own destiny in accordance with established democratic processes without any intervention of whatever form or whatever source; 3) when that aggression has ceased, Vietnam will ask that all friendly countries withdraw their military forces from South Vietnam with the proviso that it will call again for foreign assistance in the event of renewed aggression; and 4) the independence and liberty of the Vietnamese people must be effectively guaranteed.

C. PEACE PROPOSALS

1. In a public proclamation on June 18, the GVN announced that it welcomed the initiative of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers for restoring peace, but noted that none of the previous peace proposals had evoked a favorable response from the Communists.

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] India and other Afro-Asian countries were working on a proposal on Vietnam which they had planned to submit to the Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers. The proposal reportedly would have urged the US, the GVN, and the Liberation Front to open discussions immediately on the cessation of military activities both in South and North Vietnam.

D. ALGERIA AND THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE

The GVN showed considerable interest in the Algiers coup and its effect on the Afro-Asian Conference. A congratulatory telegram was sent from the GVN to Colonel Boumedienne, new strongman in Algeria.

E. FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE

1. AUSTRALIA

The 1st Royal Australian Regiment consisting of over 900 combat troops arrived at Vung Tau and has joined the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in operations.

2. NEW ZEALAND

The NZG reaffirmed its intention to withdraw its 25-man engineer unit from South Vietnam. Subsequently, Prime Minister Holyoake announced that departure of a 120-man artillery battery for South Vietnam would be held up pending the outcome of the Commonwealth peace mission. It was also announced that New Zealand was contributing \$28,000 for refugee relief in South Vietnam.

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3. PHILIPPINES

Although President Macapagal advised our ambassador that he would recertify to Congress his bill for Philippine assistance to South Vietnam, he did not do so during the first special session which ended on 25 June. On 30 June Macapagal indicated to Ambassador Ledesma that he will not recertify the Vietnam bill unless assured at passage in its original form, i.e., the engineering battalion with the necessary security troops.

4. REPUBLIC OF KOREA


On 15 June the GVN formally submitted a request to the ROK for a Korean combat division. President Pak expects to obtain the authority for sending this unit from the National Assembly which will reconvene on 12 July.

SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965


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
PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)



WEAPONS LOSSES



VIET CONG ACTIVITIES




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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS MONTHLY REPORT

SECRET PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)




* WOUNDED NOT INCLUDED. VIET CONG FIGURES UNAVAILABLE.

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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT

WEAPONS LOSSES - VIETNAM and VIET CONG




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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

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INCIDENTS - VIET CONG



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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 26 June 1965

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	211	116	391	890	1396	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	688	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	205	1327	2016	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1480	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1870	1650	-	232	529	2473	2399	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	256	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	2223	2143	-	873	548	4065	2781	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	416	77	441	1015	2523	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1862	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965*	2262	1061	1671	1631	-	1101	133	3793	1804	2078	672
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	934	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619

*Through 26 June only

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Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2583	607	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2755	-	-
	1963	1882	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4237	1270	5701	12882	30896	5195	4049*
1963	17813	5665	20574	11488	3462	3137	4290	20290	28385	8267	5397
1964	28526	7477	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965**	12639	5236	11553	10835	-	4791	2478	20862	14041	10132	4505

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

**Through 26 June only

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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 26 June 1965

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small-Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size						
1962	1825	528	--	--	--	549	839	180	257	--
Jan 1963	927	242	2	8	8	252	447	49	179	--
1964	1770	218	3	2	2	223	1244	129	174	--
1965	2206	57	1	5	5	63	1489	272	170	212
1962	1460	480	--	--	--	500	613	137	210	--
Feb 1963	788	181	1	13	13	195	433	69	91	--
1964	2078	211	3	3	3	217	1389	201	271	--
1965	1982	73	3	6	6	82	1411	267	91	131
1962	1961	561	--	--	--	588	660	290	423	--
Mar 1963	1282	333	0	11	11	344	653	131	154	--
1964	2160	198	1	4	4	203	1632	158	167	--
1965	2056	80	3	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
1962	1933	470	--	--	--	497	1024	220	192	--
Apr 1963	1331	371	3	9	9	383	688	105	155	--
1964	2284	211	3	6	6	220	1738	169	157	--
1965	1860	38	4	1	1	43	1407	149	96	165
1962	1825	490	--	--	--	528	892	154	251	--
May 1963	1208	344	0	13	13	357	608	93	150	--
1964	2143	170	2	3	3	175	1418	217	140	193
1965	2263	40	11	7	7	58	1555	365	115	170
1962	1477	385	1	21	21	407	736	157	222	--
Jun 1963	1311	398	1	11	11	410	652	107	142	--
1964	2062	128	2	10	10	140	1390	176	162	194
1965*	2262	56	5	1	1	62	1544	416	83	157
1962	1564	437	1	10	10	448	735	158	223	--
Jul 1963	1368	398	1	8	8	407	698	80	183	--
1964	3045	166	12	7	7	185	2132	286	224	218
1962	1642	368	0	9	9	377	885	146	233	--
Aug 1963	1349	356	1	11	11	368	647	113	221	--
1964	2580	107	3	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204

*Through 26 June only

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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small-Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size	Total				
1962	1375	382	0	9	391	624	178	182	--
Sep 1963	1763	483	3	17	503	889	164	207	--
1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
1962	1357	406	1	12	419	583	189	166	--
Oct 1963	1422	363	0	6	369	802	105	150	--
1964	2827	75	6	2	83	1790	480	197	277
1962	1311	411	3	7	421	614	144	132	--
Nov 1963	3182	631	3	11	645	1990	269	278	--
1964	1982	57	1	2	60	1391	247	109	175
1962	1346	375	1	8	384	670	107	185	--
Dec 1963	1882	258	0	3	261	1228	111	251	--
1964	2504	81	6	9	96	1719	318	128	243


Composite Annual Totals

1962	19,076	5295	41	173	5509	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17,813	4358	15	121	4494	9735	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28,526	1732	46	55	1833	18656	3178	2080	1879
1963*	12,629	344	27	23	394	8882	1709	945	999

*Through 26 June only

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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM



SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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